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Discovery of Experts: A Historical Problem
and A Proposed FRCP Solution
Thus civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be
carried on in the dark. The way is now clear, consistent with
recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest pos-
sible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.'
But a common law trial is and always should be an adver-
sary proceeding. Discovery was hardly intended to enable a
learned profession to perform its functions either without wits
or on wits borrowed from the adversary.2
I. INTRODUCTION
It was within the context of the two countervailing con-
siderations suggested by the above quotations that the Supreme
Court decided Hickman v. Taylor,3 a decision which has stood for
over 20 years as the primary source of enlightenment in the
area of discovery. The actual holding of the Court was that
written statements, private memoranda, and personal recollec-
tions prepared or formed by an attorney in preparation for litiga-
tion or trial, could not be discovered by an adverse party in the
absence of necessity or justification. 4 Also important, however,
was the call for liberal interpretation of the discovery rules5
and a censure of certain concepts which tended to restrict them.6
The Court failed, however, to establish any guidelines for future
application of these policies in discovering expert witnesses. 7
1. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
2. Id. at 516.
3. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
4. Id. at 508-510 (1947).
5. The Court said, 'We agree, of course, that the deposition-
discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment."
Id. at 507.
6. The Court specifically stated, "No longer can the time-hon-
ored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquiring
into the facts underlying his opponent's case." Id.
7. The term "expert witness" is very broad in scope. It can best
be defined by contrasting the expert's function as a witness with the
function of other witnesses.
An observer is qualified to testify because he has firsthand
knowledge which the jury does not have of the situation or
transaction at issue. The expert has something different to
contribute. This is a power to draw inferences from the facts
which a jury would not be competent to draw. To warrant the
use of expert testimony, then, two elements are required.
First, the subject of the inference must be so distinctively
related to some science, profession, business or occupation as to
be beyond the ken of the average layman, and second, the wit-
ness must have such skill, knowledge or experience in that
field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion or infer-
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The expert plays a unique dual role in our judicial system.
He often is an integral part of the trial preparation process,
working with the available informalion and materials. He tests,
graphs, quantifies, qualifies and generally uses all his specialized
knowledge to elicit the "ultimate facts" which support a given
claim. In this capacity as a discoverer and creator of relevant
facts, the expert works under the control and for the interests of
an attorney and client.
However, the expert often functions in another role at trial,
testifying to the results of his work so that they may be "proven"
or "disproven" in a court of law. In this capacity the expert
assumes the role of a witness, rendering testimony to the exist-
ence of facts relevant to the issues being tried. Just as an eye-
witness to an accident may be questioned as to his eyesight and
memory, the expert may be questioned as to his qualifications as
an expert, the methods he employed., and any other factors rele-
vant to judging the evidence he is presenting.8
The federal courts have almost uniformly failed to distin-
guish between these separate roles of the expert when called on
to apply the discovery procedures of the Federal Rules. More-
over, they have often invoked inappropriate concepts and
standards to their narrow view of the expert. The district
courts' approaches to the discoverability of expert witnesses have
developed along divergent and often contradictory lines.9
Recently an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure was proposed which attempts to provide a uniform ap-
proach to these problems.10 It is the purpose of this Note to
ence will probably aid the trier in his search for the truth.
C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13, 28-29 (1954).
See also E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 222-24 (1961); 7 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1923, 1925 (3d ed. 1940).
8. See 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 992 (3d ed. 1940), and cases
cited therein.
9. A general compilation of these cases is found at 4 J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.24, at 1523-26 (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited
as MOOE]. Perhaps the most extreme example of the conflicting na-
ture of these cases is found in the situation where a single report of
an expert was found to be discoverable in one jurisdiction and non-
discoverable in another when the same litigation was being conducted in
two districts. Compare Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Ohio 1947), affd sub nom., Sachs v. Aluni-
num Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948), with Cold Metal
Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947).
10. Proposed Amendment 26(b) (4) of COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, PRELIvINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1967), 43 F.R.D. 211
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analyze that proposal in the context of both the policies an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor and the
role of the expert in the litigation process.
II. DISCOVERY
A. FUNCTION AND PURPOSE or DiscovERY
Necessary to any analysis of expert discovery is an under-
standing of the function and purpose of discovery in general. At
common law, the pleadings were utilized to compel the exchange
of information prior to trial." Beyond the pleadings, which were
most often of little assistance, means of pre-trial discovery were
few in number and seldom used.'2 The weakness of this system
was, of course, the inability of counsel to learn the necessary
facts either to prepare adequately or to focus on facts actually
controverted.13
In an attempt to overcome these weaknesses, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938,14 fashioned an entirely
(1968) [hereinafter cited as 1967 PRELIm. DRAFT]. This proposed amend-
ment regarding experts is a part of rather extensive reorganization
and reformation of the Rules of Civil Procedure relating to discovery.
See generally 1967 PREn. DRAFT 8-12; Note, Proposed 1967 Amend-
ments to the Federal Discovery Rules, 68 CoLluW. L. REv. 271 (1968).
These proposals were drafted by the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules. They were submitted to the Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States for con-
sideration and ultimate report to the entire Conference. The Judicial
Conference will then report to the Supreme Court on these proposals.
The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure published these
proposals on November 30, 1967, and called for comment by the bench
and bar. Final consideration by the Committee was to be made some-
time after January 1, 1969.
11. See G. RAGLAND, DIscovERY BEFORE TRiL& 1-10 (1932); Sunder-
land, The Theory and Practice of Pre-trial Procedure, 36 Mcu. L. REv.
215 (1937); Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HAv. L. REv. 940,
946 (1961).
12. Taine, Discovery of Trial Preparations in the Federal Courts,
50 CoLum. L. REv. 1026 (1950). For a discussion of these various com-
mon law discovery procedures and their uses see Developments, supra
note 11, at 946-50.
13. This problem was widely recognized by the commentators
prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The great weakness of pleading as a means for developing and
presenting issues of fact for trial lay in its total lack of any
means for testing the factual basis for the pleaders allegations
and denials.
Sunderland, supra note 11, at 216. See also RAGLAND, supra note 11,
at 1-10.
14. In 1934, by act of Congress, the Supreme Court was given
power to provide a uniform procedure governing civil actions. Act of
June 19, 1934 (Rule-Making Statute of 1934), ch. 651, §§ 1, 2, 48 Stat.
1969]
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different approach to trial preparation. The Federal Rules em-
ploy the pleadings merely to give the opposing parties a general
indication of a party's claims or defenses.15 To provide a means
of ascertaining facts and clarifying issues, Rules 26 to 37 were
promulgated to permit discovery of other parties' evidence.10
The purpose of the Federal Rules is announced by the last
sentence in Rule 1, which states that they "shall be construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action." 17 This purpose is implemented by the discovery rules
in three primary ways: disclosure and presentation; issue for-
mulation; and encouragement of settlement.
The effort to secure a just determination is advanced by the
rules of discovery in bringing about the "disclosure and presen-
tation" of all the relevant evidence. By permitting compulsory
pre-trial exchange of information the discovery rules lead to a
minimal concealment of relevant information is Also, exami-
nation of parties and witnesses shortly after the occurrence or
transaction is apt to result in a more accurate statement than
one taken at trial, which may be affected by time or the work-
ings of advocacy. In addition, the existence of written state-
ments avoids the risk of lost testimony due to the inability of
the witness to be present at trial. 9 Finally, the presence of a
written statement lessens the opportunity for perjury because of
the difficulty in fabricating evidence which contradicts a prior
statement made during discovery.20
1064, 28 U.S.C. §§ 723b, 723c (1940), now found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2073(1964). This power was first exercised in 1938 with the promulgation
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 308 U.S. 645 (1939).
15. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Kellogg Co. v. Na-
tional Biscuit Co., 38 F. Supp. 643 (D.N.J. 1941). See generally 2A
MOORE 98.03, at 1613.
16. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682
(1958) ("[Modern instruments of discovery] . . .make a trial less a game
of blindman's buff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and
facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent."); Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) ("Thus civil trials in the federal courts no
longer need be carried on in the dark.").
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
18. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). The purposes of
discovery are discussed in 4 MOORE ff 26.02; Developments, supra note 11,
at 944-46.
19. Use of a deposition of a non-party witness for other than im-
peachment purposes is allowable in the circumstances described in Rule
26 (d) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
20. See RAGLAND, supra note 11, at 124-25. Professor Ragland's
early investigation in this area lends practical support to this idea.
[Vol. 53:785
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Discovery aids in "issue formulation" by revealing both
agreement on issues which may superficially appear to be in
conflict and a clear delineation of the issues actually in dispute.2 1
As the controverted issues become more precisely defined, it is
easier for counsel to present evidence in a more efficient and
orderly fashion, saving time and expense while also assisting the
judge or jury in understanding the genuine controversies in-
volved.22
"Encouragement of settlement" is also effectuated through
the discovery rules by disclosing the parties' relative strength
and by providing the parties with the factual basis necessary to
determine the amount of a settlement. Similarly, discovery of-
ten exposes fraudulent, false and groundless claims and de-
fenses.23
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF Hickman v. TayZor
The most perplexing problem created by the discovery rules
was the extent to which a party could require discovery of an
adversary's investigation file and trial preparations. 24 The Ad-
visory Committee, working from 1942 to 1946 on an amendment
to alleviate this problem,25 ultimately concluded that discovery
of trial preparation should be allowed only where the inquiring
party could show that the inquiry was necessary to avoid prej-
udice, undue hardship, or injustice. Further, an absolute pro-
tection was given to both the attorney's mental impressions
and the expert's conclusions.26 This approach specifically re-
21. This aspect of discovery and its relationship to the expert wit-
ness is the subject of special concern in Long, Discovery and Experts
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 WASH. L. REv. 665 (1964).
22. Time and expense are saved not only in eliminating issues,
but also in providing counsel with some indication of how much effort
and proof will be needed to prove conclusively any particular element
of his case. See Developments, supra note 11, at 945.
23. These groundless claims or defenses, once exposed, can be
"settled" without trial by summary judgment. This aspect of discovery
has special relevance to expert testimony where, without pre-trial prep-
aration, the technical or scientific testimony of the expert may be very
difficult or impossible to expose as false or inaccurate. See Osborn,
Reasons and Reasoning in Expert Testimony, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
488 (1935).
24. See 4 MOORE 1 26.23, at 13.15; Armstrong, Report of the Advisory
Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Recommending Amend-
ments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 354 (1946).
25. The amendment was aimed at Rule 30(b). See Report of the
Advisory Committee, 5 F.R.D. 434 (1946).
26. The wording of the proposal was:
19691
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
jected27 proposals which would have given unqualified immunity
to this "work product" as required by the Third Circuit in Hick-
man v. TayZor.28
While this proposed amendment to Rule 30(b) was never
adopted by the Supreme Court, it was significantly reflected by
that Court's decision in Hickman v. Taylor.29 The litigation in
Hickman concerned claims for the death of five seamen in the
sinking of a tugboat. Interrogatories directed by the plaintiff
to the tug owners requested any written statements obtained
from the crew of the vessels involved and all memoranda cover-
ing any oral statements which may have been taken.80 The tug
owners refused to answer, other than to admit that statements
of the survivors had been taken, on the ground that this request
asked for privileged matter obtained in preparation for trial.31
The district court held the requested materials were not priv-
ileged and ordered their production.32 Upon refusal to comply,
the court held the recalcitrant counsel in contempt. The Court
The court shall not order the production or inspection of any
part of the writing that reflects an attorney's mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories, or, except as pro-
vided in Rule 35, the conclusions of an expert.
Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the
District Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 457 (1946).
27. See Advisory Notes, 5 F.R.D. 433, 460 (1946).
28. 153 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1945), aff d on other grounds, 329 U.S. 495
(1947). The Third Circuit decision rejected the "fishing expedition" and
"property right" objections to discovery. Its primary concern was the
attorney-client relationship and it was on the basis of this relationship
that the court found the information non-discoverable. Rule 26(b),
then as now, stated in pertinent part that, "[U]nless otherwise ordered
by the court. .. , the deponent may ba examined regarding any mat-
ter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter in-
volved in the pending action. .. ." Fsa. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (emphasis
added). After finding that this privilege exception of Rule 26 applied
to Rule 33 interrogatories, the Third Circuit held that the privilege
included the materials sought to be discovered in that proceeding.
153 F.2d at 222-23. Thus, their ruling would have given the attorney's
work product an absolute immunity from discovery.
29. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See Taine, supra note 12, at 1030.
30. Supplemental interrogatories asked whether any oral or writ-
ten statements, records, reports or other memoranda had been made
concerning any matter relative to the towing operation, the sinking of
the tug, the salvaging and repair of the tug, and the death of the de-
ceased. If the answer was in the affirmative, the tug owners were then
requested to set forth the nature of all such records, reports, statements
or other memoranda. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 498-500 (1947).
31. The attorney, Mr. Fortenbaugh, had been employed by the tug
owners soon after the accident in anticipation of possible lawsuits. The
attorney had sought out the witnesses and obtained their statements
in this capacity. Id.
32. Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
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of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, reasoning that "privi-
lege," as used in Rule 26, was more expansive than the attorney-
client privilege and also included the "work product of the law-
y er. ,
33
While the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Court
of Appeals, the reasoning used to reach this affirmation was strik-
ingly different. The majority opinion, by Mr. Justice Murphy,
summarily disposed of the reasoning that the privilege accorded
by Rule 26 includes an attorney's work product. 4 The opinion
noted, however, that "the impropriety of invoking that privilege
does not provide an answer to the problem before us. ' 35 Em-
phasis was put on the fact that in the case before the Court the
party seeking discovery had full access to the facts and the wit-
nesses interviewed by the defendant's attorney. The Court con-
cluded:
... [this] is simply an attempt, without purported necessity
or justification, to secure written statements, private memoranda
and personal recollections prepared or formed by an adverse
party's counsel in the course of his legal duties. As such, it
falls outside the arena of discovery and contravenes the public
policy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal
claims. Not even the most liberal of discovery theories canjustify unwarranted inquiries into the files and mental im-
pressions of an attorney.36
The Court's decision seems to be based on two interrelated
policy considerations. The majority opinion suggests that if the
written efforts of the attorney-advocate were open to unlimited
discovery, much of his work would go unwritten and "ineffi-
ciency, unfairness, and sharp practices would inevitably de-
velop" in the legal profession.37 Secondly, discovery of written
33. 153 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1945). The term "work product of the
lawyer" was apparently first used in the argument of Hickman v. Tay-
lor to the Third Circuit. 4 MooRE 1 26.23, at 1356. The phrase was then
adopted by the circuit court in their opinion, 153 F.2d 212, 223, and
finally given approval by the Supreme Court in their affirmance of
that opinion. 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). It was defined by the Supreme
Court as including interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence,
mental impressions and numerous other means by which an attorney
attempts to protect the interests of his client by the use of his pro-
fessional skills. Id.
34. It is unnecessary here to delineate the content and scope of
that privilege as recognized in the federal courts. For present
purposes, it suffices to note that the protective cloak of this
privilege does not extend to information which an attorney se-
cures from a witness while acting for his client. ...
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 510.
37. Id. at 511. This point of view was reiterated by the concur-
rence of Mr. Justice Jackson which emphasized the position that dis-
19691
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statements, especially memoranda of oral statements, might well
force the attorney to the witness stand to testify as to their
accuracy.3 8 As a participant in the controversy, the lawyer's
role as an officer of the court and as an advocate would obviously
suffer.3 9 The Court refrained, however, from laying down any
general rule proscribing discovery of all materials prepared or
obtained in anticipation of litigation and noted that there would
be situations of "necessity or justification" in which a party
could compel discovery.40
In analyzing the propositions and views of Hickman, it is
helpful to view the problem formulated by the Court:
Examination into a person's files and records, including
those resulting from the professional activities of an attorney,
must be judged with care. It is not without reason that various
safeguards have been established to preclude unwarranted
excursions into the privacy of a mar's work. At the same time,
public policy supports reasonable and necessary inquiries.
Properly to balance these competing interests is a delicate and
difficult task.4 '
Thus, the Court's position would support the contention that
discovery is to be allowed unless a countervailing factor super-
sedes the public interest in discovery. The Court recognizes one
such factor as the nature of the adversary process which requires
some degree of private preparation. To eliminate this privacy
where alternative channels of obtaining equivalent information
are open would be an unnecessary sacrifice to the adversary proc-
ess. 42 When analyzed in this manner, the "necessity or justifi-
covery is not intended to depose the adversary system. Id. at 516. This
idea was stated to be a fundamental assumption of the Advisory Com-
mittee in drafting the 1946 Proposed Amendment to Rule 30 (b). See
the remarks of Senator Pepper in Discovery Procedure Symposium,
5 F.R.D. 403, 405 (1946).
38. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 513 (1947); id. at 517-18
(concurring opinion).
39. His role as a professional advocate would be especially com-
promised if statements obtained by him from witnesses or his recollec-
tions of oral statements were used to impeach a witness to the detriment
of his client's interests.
40. The Court suggested discovery might be justified where
witnesses were no longer available. Were discovery to be precluded
under these circumstances the Court felt that ". . . the liberal ideals of
the deposition-discovery portions of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure would be stripped of much of their meaning." Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511-12 (1947).
41. Id. at 497.
42. It has been suggested that this privacy is that last vestige of
the "fox and hounds" theory of the lawsuit. Note, 62 HARv. L. REV. 269,
270 (1948). Granting the correctness of this suggestion, it is equally
true that the operation of an adversary system needs some amount of
independent work. It is clear that the proposed 1946 amendment to
[Vol. 53:785
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cation" exception to the work product doctrine appears as a
means of balancing the two interests and focusing attention on
the point at which the adversary system does not have a justi-
fiable interest in protection. The Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure are rooted in the assumption that litigation is to be ban-
died by advocates in full possession of all the relevant facts,
and should not be utilized to suppress necessary information. 43
The Court in Hickman, therefore, attempted to establish a rule
which would allow the goals of discovery and the necessities of
the adversary system to co-exist. It is within this context that
the questions surrounding the discovery of expert witnesses
should be considered.
M. APPROACHES TO DISCOVERY OF THE EXPERT
As has been indicated, the boundaries of work product dis-
covery are at best nebulous and at worst non-existent. District
courts have been shackled with the task of determining bound-
aries for discovering experts on the basis of general policy con-
siderations announced in a case which did not even deal with
experts.44 The lack of guidelines, either by decision or by rule,
has led to a proliferation of various ancillary theories for the
application of discovery to experts. While they have little in
common, these theories generally have confined discovery to
extremely narrow areas of expert information.45 In so restricting
expert discovery the courts seem to have relied on three distinct
grounds: attorney-client privilege; the "work product" doctrine;
Rule 30(b) rejected the concept that our judicial system could function
as an idealistic search for truth wherein the individual litigants would
pool their resources. See Discovery Procedure Symposium, 5 F.R.D. 403,
404 (1946).
43. Although promotion of the adversary system and the avoidance
of surprise at trial appear inconsistent, the necessity or justification ex-
ception of Hickman provides a method of reconciliation. Where the
circumstances are such that independent advocates could not obtain
equivalent or similar information, the "good cause" exception provides
a means whereby that particular information can be obtained and
"trial by surprise" avoided. While superior advocacy is important, each
side theoretically has an equal opportunity to obtain all relevant in-
formation. See Developments, supra, note 11, at 1028; Note, Aspects of
the Minnesota Rule Prohibiting Discovery of Work-Product and Expert
Conclusions, 48 Mum. L. REV. 977, 981 (1964).
44. Hickman dealt with the attorney's pretrial preparation rather
than preparation done by an expert at the request of an attorney.
45. See 4 MoopE f 26.24; Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an
Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REV. 455 (1962); Long,
supra note 21, at 666; Winner, Procedural Methods to Attain Discovery,
28 F.R.D. 97, 101-103 (1962); Developments, supra note 11, at 1038.
1969]
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and the "unfairness rule.146
A. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Some courts47 have indicated that communications of experts
are not discoverable because they fall within the scope of the
attorney-client privilege. This has been a minority position,
however, and the Supreme Court decision in Hickman v. Taylor
has made it difficult to sustain.48 Though the Hickman decision
does not concern itself with the discovery of expert witnesses,
the broad language of the Court 49 seems to support Professor
Moore's argument that "if memoranda prepared by counsel him-
self are not privileged, a fortiori reports prepared for him by
experts are not."50  However, as was stated by the Hickman
decision,51 a determination that privilege does not exist is not
conclusive as to whether discovery should be allowed.
B. EXTENSION OF THE WORK PRODUCT DocTRnqE
A more extensively employed method of limiting expert dis-
covery has been found within the ambit of the Hickman "work
product" doctrine. The source of this protective approach is
probably a long-standing inclination to consider the specially
retained expert as an assistant counsel.5 2  This attitude was
46. See D. LOUISELL, MoDERN CAILFORNIA DIsCOVERY § 11, at 315
(1963); Friedenthal, supra note 45.
47. See Schuyler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 111 (M.D. Pa.
1950); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 684
(D. Mass. 1947); Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp.
21 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
48. But see Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947). In that case Cold Metal had employed
two scientists to test certain claims made in one of their patents.
Cold Metal brought suit against Aluminum Company for patent in-
fringement. One defense was that the patent was invalid because of
the falsity of these same claims. In attempting to discover the find-
ings of the scientists employed by Cold Metal, Aluminum Company cited
Hickman as authority. The district court, however, relied on Hickman
to deny discovery. Oddly enough, the court found that ".... public
policy would seem to compel the extension of the privilege rule to the
situation as presented here." Id. at 687. While Hickman may have
been authority for denying discovery, it could hardly be cited for an
extension of the privilege rule. See note 34 supra, and accompanying
text.
49. See note 34 supra, and accompanying text.
50. See 4 MooRE 11 26.24, at 1528. See also LouiSELL, supra note
46, at 316; Keegan, Privileged Matters and Protective Orders, 1959 U. ILL.
L.F. 801, 810-11. But see Friedenthal, supra note 45, at 459.
51. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947).
52. This attitude appears to have originated in Lalance & Gros-
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given great impetus by the decision of the Third Circuit in Alt-
mont v. United States53 which extended Hickman's qualified
work product protection for attorneys to their agents. 5 4 Extend-
ing this decision, a number of courts have denied expert dis-
covery, reasoning that the expert was an agent of the attorney. 5
Other courts, while following this same approach, have inter-
preted Hickman more narrowly and have held that reports con-
taining an agent's conclusions are within the scope of Hickman
only if made under the attorney's immediate direction and super-
vision."0
However, experts are unlike other agents in that the ex-
pert's conclusions and opinions often constitute evidence in them-
selves.67 To this extent, the expert information is dissimilar
jean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mg. Co., 87 F. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1898). The
case concerned patent litigation and the defendant was seeking to ob-
tain a letter from plaintiff's attorney to an expert in the field con-
cerning the scientific issues in controversy. The court said that:
... questions of science and art are frequently so mingled
with questions of patent law, in controversies arising upon some
patent, that a party substantially retains an expert to conduct
the case almost as associate counsel with the solicitor.
Id. at 564. On this basis the court found that the communications
between an attorney and an expert retained by him would normally
be privileged. However, it is highly interesting to note that the court
went on to say that:
It would seem, however, that in such a case the privilege
should be lost when the expert ceases to act as counsel, and
allows himself to be made a witness; at least, to the extent to
which he testifies.
Id. It is somewhat ironic that this latter pronouncement, on which
the actual decision turned, should have been overlooked while the
more restive concept of "assistant counsel" is relied upon. See, e.g., Cold
Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 684 (D.Mass.
1947).
53. 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1950).
54. For a general discussion of Alltmont, see Snyder v. United
States, 20 F.R.D. 7 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); Keegan, Privileged Matter and
Protective Orders, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 801, 806-07; Tollman, Discovery
Under the Federal Rules: Production of Documents and the Work
Product of the Lawyer, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 498, 508-09 (1958). For an
excellent criticism see Comment, 41 MniNN. L. REv. 823 (1957). This
criticism was based upon the distinction between invading the privacy
of an attorney's preparation and obtaining reports which were handed
the attorney without any of his personal effort. Id. at 825.
55. See, e.g., Carpenter-Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum
Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257 (D. Neb. 1959); Colden v. R.J. Schofield Motors, 14
F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
56. See, e.g., Fahey v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 231, 234 (S.D.N.Y.
1955); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792,
795 (D. Del. 1954); Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D.
55, 58 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
57. See C. McCoRMiICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW Or EVIDENCE §§ 13,
14 (1954); 7 J. WIGM OE, EVIDENCE §§ 1923, 1925 (3d ed. 1940); Rosenthal,
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from that sought to be protected by Hickman; its nature is such
that it is often impossible to uncover absent pre-trial discovery.
Furthermore, one of the major considerations behind the work
product immunization is the harmful effect on the adversary
process of having lawyers testify in cases they are trying. s
Since experts are themselves proper witnesses, this justification
is here inapplicable. 59
A variation of the work product shield over experts has
been the protection of their conclusions and opinions while allow-
ing discovery of their findings and observations. 60 This distinc-
tion between fact and opinion seems indefensible in several re-
gards.6 1 As mentioned above, the experts' conclusions are evi-
dentiary in nature.62 As a consequence, if discovery of conclu-
sions is restricted, the function that discovery serves in ascer-
taining evidence and in narrowing issues will be frustrated.
Furthermore, since the conclusions and observations of experts
are proper evidence, it is meaningless to separate them. When
experts testify, the issues will often involve the correctness of
their methods, techniques and judgment. As regards these
issues, the "facts" are the opinions, conclusions and methods of
the expert and not merely the raw data he has obtained. Thus,
where tests are performed in order to determine the validity
of patent claims, the conclusion of the scientist will be evidence
introduced into court. But the basis leading to this conclusion
will also be in evidence; the validity of the test methods used, the
reliability of the test results, as well as the validity of the con-
clusion drawn from the raw data might all be at issue.63
The Development of the Use of Expert Testimony, 2 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 403 (1935).
58. See note 38 supra, and accompanying text.
59. See Long, supra note 21, at 691; 'Note. supra note 43, at 981.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 25 F.R.D.
192 (N.D. Calif. 1959); White Pine Copper Co. v. Continental Ins. Co.,
166 F. Supp. 148, 162-63 (W.D. Mich. 1958); Cinema Amusements, Inc.
v. Loew's, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 318, 320 (D. Del. 1947).
61. This distinction between findings and conclusions cannot bejustified when dealing with expert discovery. However, on a practi-
cal level this distinction may be significant as to a showing of necessity.
Where comparable experts are available but the materials have been so
altered as to prevent duplication of necessary tests, it would be ap-
propriate to allow discovery of test results but not conclusions. See
note 85 infra, and accompanying text.
62. See note 57 supra, and accompanying text.
63. This example is factually similar to a case in which discovery
was not allowed. Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
7 F.R.D. 684, 687 (D. Mass. 1947).
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It is fundamental to an understanding of the relationship
between the expert witness and the discovery rules to realize
that, by his knowledge and expertise, the expert "creates" evi-
dence-ultimate facts-from the situation with which he works.
Pre-trial discovery on this level may be absolutely essential to
prevent surprise and to clarify and narrow issues.6 4
C. PROTECTION THROUGH THE "IJNFAIRNES RULE"
Restricting the discoverability of experts on concepts of fair-
ness has probably been the majority position of courts 5 and
some of the leading commentators. 6 This approach was pre-
sented in the first reported decision dealing with expert dis-
covery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
To permit a party by deposition to examine an expert of the
opposite party before trial, to whom the latter has obligated
himself to pay a considerable sum of money, would be equiva-
lent to taking another's property without making any compen-
sation therefor.6 7
Albeit important, this observation is apparently not crucial
since a willingness to share the expert's fees, of itself, is usually
not considered sufficient to permit discovery.6 8 However, detri-
mental effects of unrestricted expert discovery on the adversary
system have been noted: the penalization of diligence and pro-
motion of laziness,69 and the inhibition to use experts in liti-
64. In E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
24 F.R.D. 416, 421 (D. Del. 1959), a patent infringement suit, the evi-
dence on both sides was of a highly technical nature. The court in this
case recognized that, "[u]nless procedures can be inquired into and
records of actual tests produced, neither party can have any idea of
whiat the evidence against it is going to be." The court failed to
recogniz% however, that this same problem would exist to a lesser de-
gree in any trial where use was made of expert opinion and testimony.
65. See, e.g., Smith v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 188 F. Supp. 135 (E.D. Pa.
1960); E.L duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24
F.R.D. 416 (D. Del. 1959); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947); Lewis v. United Air Lines Trans-
port Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
66. See, e.g., 4 MooRE 26.24; Keegan, supra note 54; cf. Long, supra
note 21, at 665.
67. Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21, 23
(W.D. Pa. 1940).
68. See Hickey v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1952);
Boynton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941);
Friedenthal, note 45 supra, at 483.
69. The most famous presentation of this idea is found in McCarthy
v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1939), affd, 113 F.2d 721
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 680 (1940):
While the Rules of Civil Procedure were designed to permit
liberal examination and discovery, they were not intended to
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gation.70 However, since this approach bases its restrictions on
concepts of fairness, an exception is provided to allow discovery
of an expert where necessity can be shown by the discovering
party.71
The problems and inconsistencies in this approach are numer-
ous. The expense consideration seems somewhat inconsistent
with the situation where discovery is permitted of an ordinary
witness who has been located only after great expenditures of
time and money. The concept of a property right, while having
some support, 72 competes with the public interest in full expo-
sition of the facts. And finally, the notion that discovery can
lead to an unjust advantage-taking of an opponent's trial prep-
aration has not been determinative in protecting non-expert
witnesses.
In spite of these weaknesses, the "unfairness rule" remains
rather persuasive. Most of the criticisms lose their potency when
necessity exists. Furthermore, the expert is an exception among
witnesses in that he normally has no unique knowledge of the
facts, but "creates" evidence from them. To the extent that his
be made the vehicle through which one litigant could make
use of his opponent's preparation of his case. To use them in
such a manner would penalize the diligent and place a premium
on laziness. It is fair to assume that, except in the most unusual
circumstances, no such result was intended.
While the issue in this case concerned the introduction of a document
into evidence, it has often been cited as applicable to the issue of dis-
covering expert information. See, e.g., United Air Lines v. United
States, 26 F.R.D. 213 (D. Del. 1960); Schuyler v. United Air Lines, 10
F.R.D. 111 (M.D. Pa. 1950).
70. See Friedenthal, note 45 supra, at 460; Developments in the
Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 1032 (1961). But see Note, supra
note 42, at 272. The normal reasoning is, of course, that if the reports
of the expert are discoverable an attorney would not wish to use experts
for fear of finding something advantageous to his opponent.
71. See Russo v. Merck & Co., 21 F.R.D. 237 (D.R.I. 1957); Golden
v. R.J. Schofield Motors, 14 F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Ohio 1952); Cold Metal
Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Ohio 1947),
aff'd sub nom., Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th
Cir. 1948); 4 Moore [ 26.24.
72. The majority of American courts have held that an expert
may not refuse to testify or demand a fee in excess of the ordinary
witness fee. See 4 MooREf 26.24; Bomar, The Compensation of Expert
Witnesses, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 510 (1935). This rule does re-
strict the testimony which the expert may be required to give to mat-
ters within his present knowledge. He can not be required to conduct
experiments or otherwise specially prepare. 4 MooRE 26.24. However,
some cases have held that the expert may refuse to testify as to his
expert conclusions and opinions. E.g., Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15
F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954); see Friedenthal, note 45 supra, at 480.
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efforts in "creating" evidence can be duplicated, his protection
from discovery would seem to cause no major injustice. Dupli-
cation of effort seems to be justified by the nature of the adver-
sary system which attempts to achieve the truth by independent
representation.
The most telling criticism of the "unfairness rule," however,
is its failure to distinguish between two essentially different as-
pects and uses of the expert witness, as illustrated by Professor
Moore's formulation of the fairness test:
The court should not ordinarily permit one party to examine an
expert engaged by the adverse party, or to inspect reports pre-
pared by such expert, in the absence of a showing that the facts
or the information sought are necessary for the moving party's
preparation for trial and cannot be obtained by the moving
party's independent investigation or research.r 3
While this approach is arguably justified in regard to attempted
discovery and use of the expert in his "evidence creating" func-
tion, which often can be duplicated, it clearly has no relevance to
the use of the expert in his capacity as a witness. The emphasis
in the unfairness approach is to avoid an usurption of the knowl-
edge and expertise of an opponent's expert allowing the acqui-
sition of valuable information with little effort or expense.
However, to the extent that the expert's particular methods and
conclusions will be used as testimony, they should be divulged.
As has been discussed,74 the nature of expert testimony is such
that the methods, techniques and conclusions are important
issues, often vital to the just disposition of the case, which may
be completely unascertainable without discovery. Therefore,
any attempt to restrict expert discovery must recognize and deal
with his function as a witness, as well as a "creator" of evi-
dence.75
73. 4 MooRE 26.24, at 1531 (emphasis added). For decisions using
this approach, see Stovall v. Gulf & South American S.S., 30 F.R.D. 152
(S.D. Texas 1961) (not allowing discovery); United States v. 48 Jars,
23 F.R.D. 192 (D.D.C. 1958) (allowing discovery); United States v. Cer-
tain Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 98 (M.D. Ga. 1955) (not allowing dis-
covery).
74. See note 57 supra, and accompanying text.
75. While this approach might arguably be merely an extension of
the fairness exception, it is difficult to justify an "exception" in nearly
all cases. Some courts have recognized this special need for discovery
of evidentiary materials. See Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167
F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948); United States v. Nysco Laboratories, Inc., 26
F.R.D. 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416, (D. Del. 1959) (relied on special facts).
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D. CASES ALLOWING EXPERT DIscoEY
The cases allowing expert discovery have relied on a showing
of special need76 or a general desire not to shield experts from
discovery.77 Situations disclosing special need are of little
significance since almost all approaches allow discovery on such
a showing.78 Some courts, however, take the position that dis-
covery of experts is to be generally allowed since discovery
merely advances the stage at which disclosure can be compelled. 79
However, this approach seems to oversimplify the problem. The
scope of examination at trial is significantly different than dur-
ing pre-trial preparation. 0 Furthermore, the considerations of
fairness must be considered; the interests of the parties and the
public may be served by some degree of protection.
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 26 (b)
A. FORM AND OPmATIOv
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, in their extensive
proposals relating to discovery,8' has included a new provision
intended to unify and clarify the issue of expert discovery. The
preliminary draft of the proposed amendment, Rule 26 (b) (4), pro-
vides as follows:
26 (b) (4) Trial Preparation: Experts.
76. See note 71 supra, and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Maginnis v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 207 F. Supp.
739 (E.D. La. 1962); Russo v. Merck & Co., 21 F.R.D. 237 (D.R.I 1957);
Cold Metal Process Co v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D.
Ohio 1947).
78. See note 71 supra, and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., United States v. 38 Cases, 35 F.R.D. 357, 364 (W.D.
Pa. 1964); Leding v. United States Rubber Co., 23 F.R.D. 220, 222 (D.
Mont. 1959); Bergstrom Paper Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 7 F.R.D. 548,
550 (E.D. Wisc. 1947). This approach has a basis in dictum found in
Hickman:
The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage
at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial
to the period preceeding it, thus reducing the possibility of
surprise.
329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). However, this statement, of itself, is not de-
terminative of whether something is discoverable, as was shown by the
Hickman decision itself.
80. See 4 MooRE § 26.15. Rule 26(b) provides that, "[iut is not
ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial
if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissable evidence." FED. . . Civ. P. 26 (b). The Proposed
Amendment leaves this language basically unchanged, merely substitut-
ing the word "information" for "testimony" to permit general application
to all discovery. 1967 PELIm. DRAFT 14, 19.
81. See note 10 supra, and authorities cited therein.
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(A) Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b) (4) (B)
of this rule and Rule 35(b), a party may discover facts known
or opinions held by an expert retained or specially employed
by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation
for trial only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery is
unable without undue hardship to obtain facts and opinions on
the same subject by other means or upon a showing of other
exceptional circumstances indicating that denial of discovery
would cause manifest injustice.
(B) As an alternative or in addition to obtaining discovery
under subdivision (b) (4) (A) of this rule, a party by means of
interrogatories may require any other party (i) to identify each
person whom the other party expects to call as an expert wit-
ness at trial, and (ii) to state the subject matter on which the
expert is expected to testify. Thereafter, any party may dis-
cover from the expert or the other party facts known or opinions
held by the expert which are relevant to the stated subject
matter. Discovery of the expert's opinions and the grounds
therefor is restricted to those previously given or those to be
given on direct examination at trial.
(C) The court may require that the party seeking dis-
covery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in re-
sponding to discovery, and, with respect to discovery permitted
under subdivision (b) (4) (A) of this rule, require a party to pay
another party a fair portion of the fees and expenses incurred
by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the
expert.8 2
It is apparent that subdivisions (b) (4) (A) and (b) (4) (C),
speaking to the pre-trial use of experts rather than the witness
use of experts, as does subdivision (b) (4) (B), represent an adopt-
ion of the "unfairness" doctrine.83 The Committee's comments
reveal that it has rejected any protection of the expert based
solely on either his status as an expert or an extension of the
work product doctrine.8 4 It is the Committee's position that a
party can obtain the needed information by consulting his own
experts; where this is not possible, discovery will be allowed.
Oftentimes, where opposing experts are available, the test ma-
82. 1967 PRn=. DRAFT 15-16.
83. The "unfairness doctrine" as expounded by Professor Moore
states that:
The court should not ordinarily permit one party to examine an
expert engaged by the adverse party, or to inspect reports pre-
pared by such expert, in the absence of a showing that the
facts or the information sought are necessary for the moving
party's preparation for trial and cannot be obtained by the mov-
ing party's independent investigation or research. However,
since one of the purposes of the Federal Rules as stated in Rule 1
is to facilitate the inexpensive determination of causes, the
court should have discretion to order discovery upon condition
that the moving party pay a reasonable portion of the fees of
the expert.
4 MOORE 26.24, at 1531.
84. 1967 PRELnW. DRAFT 23.
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terials have been so altered as to prevent opposition experts
from arriving at equivalent or accurate conclusions. Thus, where
scientific testing of a substance would cause its destruction or
alteration and a similar substance is not available, discovery of
the test results, but not of the opinions drawn from them, should
be allowed. The Committee points out, therefore, that facts will
be more often discoverable than opirdons.85
Subdivision (b) (4) (C) reflects the "unfairness" doctrine's
concern with the injustice in allowing one party to take and use
information and conclusions for which the other party has in-
curred the expense.86 However, a party seeking this expensive
information could be compelled to bear part of this expense.
While the expense factor is not, standing alone, sufficient to
prohibit discovery, 7 there are no policies in favor of allowing a
party a windfall when discovery is permitted because of necessity
or some other justification.
The most noteworthy aspect of this provision is the scope of
subdivision (b) (4) (A) and the distinction between it and (b) (4)
(B). Subdivision (b) (4) (A) applies to any "expert retained or
specially employed by another party in anticipation of liti-
gation or preparation for trial. . . ." As to these experts "cre-
ating" evidence, "a party may discover facts known or opinions
held" only upon a showing of special need or hardship.
The expert to be used as a witness, on the other hand, can
be discovered under subdivision (b) (4) (B) as to "opinions pre-
viously given" and those to be given "on direct examination at
trial" without special showing. In adopting this position, the
Advisory Committee has afforded the party using the expert a
great deal of protection. Inasmuch as discovery without special
showing is allowed only of the expert who will be a witness,
the party employing an expert only to "create" evidence will be
shielded.
The Advisory Committee, in the Notes to the Proposed
Amendments, assumes that since this discovery is available only
after the parties know who their witnesses will be, it will come
too late to be a significant preparatory aid. It is not suggested
how the timing aspects will operate. Without further specificity
the danger exists that the litigants will either prepare their
cases too early, making it possible for their opponent to exploit
the preparation, or, more probably, delay naming their expert
85. 1967 PRnvLi. DRAFT 24.
86. See notes 67 & 68 supra, and accompanying text.
87. See note 68 supra, and accompanying text.
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witnesses, rendering it difficult for their opponents to use the
available discovery procedures. While discretionary authority of
the courts could be used to curb possible abuses on a case-by-
case basis, it would seem far wiser and safer to provide guide-
lines in the Rules. A suggested solution 8 would be to use the
pre-trial conference as a vehicle for arranging this discovery.
While such a solution has merit in that it would employ a
familiar procedure, the important consideration is that specific
standards or guidelines should be established.
Finally, since the scope of discovery within this provision is
restricted to opinions "previously given or those to be given
on direct examination at trial," the party seeking discovery can
be further precluded from using this process to establish his
own claim or defense. This restriction seems to be directed at
preventing the deposing party from asking hypothetical ques-
tions or questions as to which the expert does not presently have
an opinion since answers to such questions might well aid the
deposing party in establishing his own case.
Because subdivision (b) (4) (B) is dealing with the expert as a
witness there is no justification for extending its scope to matters
not within the scope of his testimony. However, the use of the
ambiguous language "previously given" may prove a major flaw
in this provision." To treat this phrase as allowing discovery of
all opinions given by the expert would undermine the amend-
ment and its dichotomous treatment of the'expert depending on
his function." Perhaps the words "those previously given"
should be deleted from the subdivision. While discovery there-
88. See Long, Discovery and Experts under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 39 WASH. L. REV. 665, 702 (1964). Long suggests that at
the pre-trial conference the court could determine whether expert wit-
nesses were going to be called and then set a date by which detailed
reports of the experts would have to be available. Id. A simpler sug-
gestion might be to require the parties to have the names of the expert
witnesses they intend to use along with reports of the experts' opin-
ions and grounds therefor available at the pre-trial conference. In
many cases an exchange of reports would provide sufficient discovery.
See 1967 PRELim. DRAFT 25.
89. Neither the text nor the Advisory Committee Notes provide any
aid in interpreting this phrase. 1967 PRELIm. DRAFT 23-25.
90. It has been suggested that the phrase "previously given" may
mean that discovery of the grounds for opinions already given in tes-
timony or discovery is to be -permitted. See Note, Proposed 1967 Amend-
ments to the Federal Discovery Rules, 68 COLU-A. L. REv. 271, 283 (1968).
Such an interpretation would be acceptable since it would limit the
discovery therein consistently with the expert's role as a witness. How-
ever, it is not at all clear from the text of the proposed amendment that
"previously given" is intended to modify only "opinions."
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under would then be limited to "opinions and the grounds there-
fore ... to be given on direct examination at trial," this knowl-
edge would be sufficient to allow the opposing counsel to prepare
cross-examination and rebuttal effectively-the stated goal of
the provision.9
The importance of subdivision (b) (4) (B), however, lies not in
its protection of the party employing the expert, but rather in its
permitting the discovery necessary for effective cross-examina-
tion and rebuttal.92 Further, the discovery of this information
is essential to a meaningful clarification and narrowing of issues.0 3
To the extent these protections permit discovery without unduly
impairing the workings of the adversary system, they clearly
advance the overall goals of the discovery procedure.
B. RELATION TO FUNCTIONS OF DISCOVERY AND THE
Hickman RATIONALE
As discussed earlier,94 the functions of discovery are dis-
closure and presentation of relevant information, issue formu-
lation, and encouragement of settlements. The decision in Hick-
man v. Taylor was shown to be concerned with preserving the
efficacy of the adversary system;9  the work product doctrine
was to achieve a balancing of discovery benefits with the needs
of an effective advocacy process. The problems created by dis-
covery of experts concern many of the same policies dealt with in
Hickman v. Taylor. The significance of the amendment proposed
by the Advisory Committee arises from the fact that it has
achieved a solution to these problems which balances the com-
peting interests near the optimal point. Subdivision (b) (4) (A)
protects the interest of the opposing parties in using the expert
to "create" evidence only to the extent that the adversary sys-
tem fails to furnish the machinery adequate to elicit necessary
and unavailable information. Subdivision (b) (4) (B) recognizes
the separate implications and functions of the expert as a witness
and allows liberal discovery of experts so functioning in the in-
terest of effective cross-examination and rebuttal, and in the in-
terest in clarifying and narrowing the issues. The protections
built into this subdivision can prevent any unnecessary en-
91. 1967 PREmiv. DRArT 24.
92. 1967 PRsnuw. DRAFT 24, 25. See also United States v. 23.76 Acres
of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963); Bergstrom Paper Co. v. Conti-
nental Ins. Co., 7 F.R.D. 548 (E.D. Wis. 1947).
93. See notes 21 & 22 supra, and accompanying text.
94. See text accompanying notes 11-23 supra.
95. See notes 41 & 42 supra, and accompanying text.
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croachment of these interests into the proper functioning of the
adversary system.
V. CONCLUSION
The problem of discovery in relation to the expert witness
and expert information is one which has long plagued the fed-
eral courts. The expert's role is not easily defined and the con-
siderations to be weighed in deciding the issue are not readily
separated. With the noted exceptions9" the amendment proposed
by the Advisory Committee provides a satisfactory, if not optimal,
solution. While the discretion of the district courts will still
play a role in the final determination, coherent and justifiable
guidelines can be estabished by the adoption of this proposal.9 7
96. See notes 88 & 89 supra, and accompanying text.
97. The proposed amendment will not and does not purport to re-
move these questions from the district courts as subjects of traditionally
recognized discretion. Even if some discovery is warranted by a show-
ing of necessity the court will still have wide powers over the scope
of that discovery. See 1967 PRELimn. DRAFT 25. As one commentator
has effectively pointed out:
The concepts embodying judicial discretion and authority
represent the only valid answer yet offered to the varied prob-
lems which may arise in determining the scope and extent of
discovery, no more nor less with experts than with other wit-
nesses or evidence .... We ... have adjustments by the courts
rather than a determination by deduction.
Long, supra note 88, at 701. The function of the proposed amendment
is to provide uniform and intelligent guidelines for the exercise of this
discretion. The diversity and confusion in approaching this problem
exhibited by the district courts provides evidence of its necessity. See
note 9 supra, and accompanying text.
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